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[The autho, who was in Nicaragua during the Oct. 20 elections, teaches sociology at the University
of Tennessee in Knoxville and is a Research Associate at the Center for International Studies in
Managua. He is a former LADB news analyst.]
Arnoldo Aleman, the still-undeclared victor in the Oct. 20 Nicaraguan elections marred by
numerous irregularities and local incidents of fraud, will face major challenges and possible political
and social conflicts inside Nicaragua and internationally when he assumes the reins of government
next Jan. 10. Aleman, of the Alianza Liberal (AL) will face at least four major challenges.

Promises to right wing
1.The Alianza made a number of promises to Aleman's militant right-wing base of support,
which he will not be able to keep without sparking widespread social conflict inside Nicaragua
and/or alienating donor countries and the international community. For instance, his campaign
was financed and supported by the far-right Cuban-American and Nicaraguan-American exile
communities in Miami and by the right-wing sectors of the business and political elites inside
Nicaragua.
According to some sources, in return for Cuban-American support, Aleman even promised to
suspend relations with Havana and convert Nicaragua into a launching pad for diplomatic and
paramilitary attacks against Cuba. However, some of Aleman's advisors have already tacitly
acknowledged that the AL administration will be forced to maintain official neutrality vis-a-vis
Cuba and to refrain from loaning out Nicaraguan territory to extremist Cuban groups. Much more
significant for the country's social stability and governability, Aleman has insisted repeatedly that
he plans to return properties that were confiscated by the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional
(FSLN) government to their original owners. Some of these properties (houses in urban zones
and land in the countryside) were distributed to poor families. Other state properties (industrial,
commercial, and financial concerns; large urban residences; and large-scale agricultural enterprises)
were appropriated by Sandinista leaders and FSLN elites during the transition from the Sandinista
to the Chamorro government in 1990.
And yet a third set of properties that had constituted part of the state sector under the Sandinistas
was privatized by the Chamorro government to national and foreign bidders rather than returned
to their pre-Sandinista owners. Aleman has promised that he will not take away properties from
poor urban families and from campesinos with small farms, but he insists that they will have to pay
for these properties at current market rates, which would well be impossible for many poor, smallproperty holders. He has also promised that large personal property holdings (for example, houses
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over 100 sq meters) and productive enterprises will either be returned to their original owners or
their current owners will have to pay indemnities to the original owners at current market rates.
The property issue has been one of the most explosive since 1990 and an outbreak of social conflict
around this issue could destabilize the country and make it ungovernable. Between 1990 and 1995,
the international community including donor countries and diplomatic envoys such as Jimmy Carter
played a crucial role in mediating a series of agreements whereby existing property holdings were
largely accepted and legalized in exchange for a complex process of paying indemnities to those
whose property had been expropriated in the form of interest-bearing government bonds.
While financing for these bonds has not yet been fully determined, Aleman's threat to simply
jettison everything regarding property that has been negotiated since 1990 is not only a threat to
the country's tenuous stability but also a gauntlet to the international donor community. On Oct.
21 and again on Oct. 22 and 23, Jimmy Carter, European Union (EU) representatives, former Costa
Rican president Oscar Arias, and other high-level international representatives in Nicaragua for the
election held tense meetings with Aleman in an attempt to convince him to moderate his position
regarding the property issue.
In these meetings, Aleman demanded that the donor community provide US$500 million
in indemnization for those whose property had been confiscated as the only alternative to
implementation of his plan for a return of these properties. Following his final, tension-filled
meeting with Aleman before leaving the country Oct. 22, an outraged Carter called Aleman
"arrogant" and "intransigent." In sum, it is not clear how the property issue will unravel once
Aleman assumes office on Jan. 10, but it will be one of the more explosive problems.

Populist Promises
2 Aleman has made populist promises to small and medium- sized businesses to provide credits
and state protection and has also negotiated backdoor deals to dole out sinecures to his thousands
of supporters via the patronage networks that he became deft at constructing during his tenure as
mayor of Managua from 1990 to 1995. Nonetheless, Aleman will find it difficult to implement any
populist measures that contravene the free-market structural adjustment program or that would
upset the country's macroeconomic stability. In turn, his failure to meet the expectations of small
and medium-sized domestic market producers, who constitute a significant portion of his social
base, will generate new political difficulties for his administration.
Similarly, it will be difficult for Aleman and his inner circle to dip into central government coffers
and utilize graft to develop a patronage network on a national scale in the same way they did in
Managua on a municipal scale.

Powerful legislature
3.Aleman will face a powerful legislature (Asamblea Nacional, AN) where he will most likely not
have a majority and where the principal opposition, his Sandinista adversaries, will be able to
exercise considerable veto power. The dramatic Ortega-Aleman polarization in the final weeks of
the campaign also had the effect of eliminating the centrist political groupings in the country's new
political landscape. The hodgepodge of center-right to center-left groups had been expected to draw
anywhere from 20% to 30% of the vote, but ended up with barely 10%.
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The polarization worked against the centrist parties in two ways. First was "voter flight" among
would-be centrist supporters who feared that a vote for the center would help bring Ortega to power
(in the case of those holding anti-Sandinista sentiments) or Aleman to power (in the case of antiSomocistas and the center-left in general). Second was a general phenomenon of voting in bloc
rather than split-ticket voting. Those who chose Aleman or Ortega at the last minute (those who
were either undecided or who had earlier expressed preference for a centrist group) simply voted
across the board for either AL or FSLN candidates, in accordance with the presidential candidate
selected, rather than voting for either Aleman or Ortega for president, and then choosing from
among centrist parties for parliamentary and municipal seats.
As a result of the polarized vote, Aleman faces, on the one hand, a powerful Sandinista bench in
the AN, and on the other hand, a very reduced group of non-Sandinista legislators with whom he
can negotiate alliances and buy support. Combined with the expected loss of support among his
social base as a result of the first two points above, the AL bench in the Asamblea Nacional is likely
to experience sharp infighting and to become splintered. Not having obtained a working majority
in the AN, Aleman will be forced to negotiate with both the FSLN and with some 10 representatives
from center-right to center-left parties who apparently managed to win seats in the legislature.
Within days of the vote, and before a winner had been announced, Nicaragua's domestic political
game had already begun to shift from assessing and contesting the electoral results to wheeling
and dealing among political elites over government posts, formal and informal alliances in the
legislature, and so forth.
For instance, Noel Vidaurre, the presidential candidate of the Partido Conservador de Nicaragua
(PCN), which came in forth in the vote, almost immediately recognized Aleman's victory and began
quiet negotiations with the AL about supporting him for the powerful post of president of the
Asamblea Nacional the most important political post in the country after the presidency in return
for PCN support for Aleman's executive agenda. Similarly, leaders from the Proyecto Nacional
(PRONAL), the Camino Cristiano Nicaraguense (PCCN), the Movimiento Renovador Sandinista
(MRS), and other groups initially denounced the fraud that took place in the vote.
But between Oct. 23 and 25, when it became clear that they had won or will probably win a seat in
the Asamblea after the final tally is announced in mid-November, and, more importantly, when
it became clear that the donor community and the Western powers were bent on recognizing
Aleman's victory and minimizing any scandal over fraud, they quietly backtracked from their earlier
belligerence and began backdoor negotiations with the AL.

Hard-line stance
4-Aleman's own hard-line and radicalized core of supporters are viscerally anti-Sandinista, and,
at the same time, the FSLN's core of militants are viscerally anti-Aleman and feel threatened by
Aleman's electoral rhetoric and promises to eradicate all vestiges of Sandinismo. This situation in
combination with the points analyzed above could produce possible violent conflicts outside the
country's institutional structure. In addition to these four challenges, Aleman will assume power
under conditions in which he enjoys formal recognition, but through an election which is tainted
by charges of irregularities and fraud. Moreover, if he is unable to create employment and alleviate
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poverty, Aleman risks widespread social unrest. In short, the most likely scenario is that Aleman will
enjoy a very short honeymoon after he assumes the presidency on Jan. 10.

-- End --
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